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ABSTRACT 
This thesis questions the notion of non-aesthetic materiality in 
painting. Beginning with a concern for the monochrome in early 
modernism, it discusses the idea of materiality in the works of Kazimir 
Malevich and Alexander Rodchenko on the basis of different 
interpretations of faktura as discussed by David Burliuk and Mikhail 
Larionov. The monochrome is further developed through a post-
Greenberg, post-Kantian discussion of material as read by Paul de 
Man, and de Man’s notion of pure, radical materiality is introduced 
and delimitated against a traditional, phenomenal account of 
materiality. These two forms of materiality are explored through of the 
work of Agnes Martin, which also provides the ground for the 
progression from the material turn as manifested in the works of the 
Russian avant-garde and the writings of Greenberg to the linguistic 
turn as proposed by de Man. De Man’s call for a non-phenomenal, 
linguistic turn in art that allows the observer to read a picture rather 
than to imagine meaning is discussed in detail. The findings of this 
discussion anchored by Kazimir Malevich and Agnes Martin are 
brought to bear on Markus Amm’s work. In the Conclusion, the idea 
of materiality oscillating between its phenomenal and non-
phenomenal forms of manifestation will be distilled from the 
discussion and tied into questions relating to my own practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This project started life through the death of a Virilian concept of 
representative painting that I was using in the studio1. I had reached 
what felt like an end point in my painterly practice: within the 
framework of my earlier train of investigation, the excessively 
speculative nature of my paintings had led me to a point of 
exhaustion. At some point I decided to overpaint my works; and 
ended up with a number of painted-out canvases in my studio. What 
became of interest to me, there seemed to be a separation of 
appearance as things and how they had been arrived at. In terms of 
things, they were mainly gestural paintings of whitish impasto with a 
trace of the surface underneath. In terms of mere appearance, they 
announced themselves as monochromes. But I had not set out to 
paint monochromes. I realised I was not sure whether one was 
different from the other in terms of appearance, and whether the 
distinction mattered. I felt I had liberated myself and my practice from 
a deadlock through material. This made me think about the 
relationship of material and painting in general, but more specifically, 
about the link between materiality, the monochrome, and whether the 
monochrome was an end point of painting, a beginning, or indeed 
both.  
 
“And Manet reinvents (or perhaps he invents) the picture-
object, the picture as materiality, the picture as something 
coloured which clarifies an external light and in front of 
which, or about which, the viewer revolves.” (Foucault, 
2013, p.31) 
 
What Foucault identified in this lecture he gave in Tunis in 1971 was 
painting as a picture-object, as material manifestation of relevance 
(relative to illusion)2. This ties in with my own experience and 
                                                
1 Paul Virilio (b. 1932) is a French philosopher, cultural theorist, and urbanist. His writings are 
broadly based on the notions of speed and power, and how technology has developed on that 
basis.  
2 It was arguably with Manet that questions of material qua material first became relevant in 
painting. Prior to Manet, as Foucault points out, material would have been seen in the context of 
its representational qualities, its suitability for creating an illusion, its ability to mask the two-
dimensionality of the surface. Manet forces a first substantial crack in this mask. 
 
If Manet caused a crack, it was the Russian avant-garde that finally took off the mask 
completely. Rodchenko and Malevich, and with them the Russian Productivists, shifted their 
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resulting concerns in the studio: painting as material. In this thesis, I 
will contend with the extent to which materiality has been at stake in 
certain aspects of painting in the modernist period. My interest is in 
how material has been read, and can be read, in contemporary 
painting. This investigation will look at certain questions pertaining to 
the monochrome within the context of materiality, which will also be 
informed by my studio practice. One could argue that the 
monochrome lends itself to the exploration of its material economies 
not the least on account of its reduced set of aesthetic variables, and 
it did indeed emerge to prominence around the time of the Russian 
avant-garde, a period when artists first became acutely concerned 
with materiality in visual art (NB. and in poetry). The monochrome 
has remained within the universe of modernist painting ever since. 
Tracing the Russian avant-garde through late modernism as 
presented by Clement Greenberg I will dedicate a section to 
materiality in Agnes Martin’s work. This will allow me to take a closer 
look at the reading of her work on the basis of the writings of Paul de 
Man, who calls for a linguistic moment in painting that hinges on non-
phenomenal, radical materiality and what he calls the linguistic turn. I 
will conclude with thoughts on the relevance of de Man’s non-
phenomenal reading of materiality for contemporary painting, and I 
will relate the reading of radical materiality in Agnes Martin’s work to 
that of the German painter Markus Amm.  
 
One of the modalities of this thesis is that it feeds the conclusions of 
my research back into my practice on an ongoing basis. My process 
is such that there is constant conversation set up between my studio 
work and my research. The studio practice triggered my interest in 
materiality. A close reading of the notions of the linguistic turn and de 
Man’s pure, radical materiality via Agnes Martin and the locating of 
these concepts in contemporary painters like Markus Amm will open 
up a new perspective on materiality, whose relevance will in turn be 
manifested in my own painting. 
                                                                                                                                                   
focus of interest from representation to the material, which led to a first idea of what painting 
qua painting, the notion of reflexive painting, i.e. a form of painting that discusses its own 
conditions, might look like. The thread was taken up by Clement Greenberg some four decades 
later, when he famously postulated that painting, like other forms of art, should divest itself of all 
its non-essentials. This led to a deeply entrenched form of aestheticised materialism that has 
spawned cycles of formalist painting to his day. 
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THE MONOCHROME: MALEVICH, RODCHENKO, AND FAKTURA  
 
Kazimir Malevich painted the first monochrome of modernism – 
whether that title goes to the Black Square (or Black Quadrilateral, as 
its official name is) from 1915, which is black on white, or Suprematist 
Composition: White on White from 1918, in which a white form is 
suspended, or hovering, on a white surface, the canvas. This series 
of paintings marked a threshold in twentieth-century art that coincided 
with the October Revolution following WWI in Russia. The emergence 
of this historical threshold curiously resonates with the borderline 
characteristics of the subject at hand, i.e. the monochrome itself. The 
latter has often been subject to liminal considerations, for example by 
Rose: “[the monochrome] is the end, not the beginning” (2006, p.76). 
While there are arguments in favour of the view that, in contrast to 
Rose’s perspective, the monochrome can also be seen as a 
beginning, the crucial point here is the fact that this form of painterly 
expression is seemingly deemed more probable to come into 
existence at a “liminal node” than at any other (more) random point 
on a continuum.  
 
While Alexander Rodchenko’s Constructivism (see below) was clearly 
in line with the ideology of the times, the revolutionary forces, having 
laid fertile soil to a thorough re-evaluation of artistic ideas, caused 
Malevich to ricochet in a completely different direction altogether: “Art 
no longer cares to serve the state and religion, it no longer wishes to 
illustrate the history of manners, it wants to have nothing further to do 
with the object, as such, and believes that it can exist, in and for itself, 
without ‘things’ “ (Malevich, 1927; however, he had started 
developing the idea of Suprematism around 1913/1914 (Wilson, 
1991)). This seemingly radical statement ultimately emanated from 
Malevich’s long-standing interest in Zaum poetry – a style of poetry 
based on linguistic experiments that resulted in the creation of a 
made-up language, Zaum, without any definite meaning3. In 1913, 
Malevich designed the stage of Mikhail Matyushin’s opera “Victory 
over the Sun”, whose libretto had been written by Aleksei Kruchonykh 
in Zaum language. Malevich in turn linked the origins of his abstract 
                                                
3 “Zaum“, translated from Russian, literally means “beyond the mind”. 
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turn to stage design and later attempted to emphasise the connection 
by sending three new drawings to Matyushin to publish as part of the 
original design (Shatskikh, 2012, pp.33-53).  
 
With Ferdinand de Saussure giving his final lectures on semiotics 
around 1913, the time was ripe for the emergence of linguistic 
concepts that called into question the absolute relation of language to 
the real object. Malevich’s move towards the abstract, towards 
Suprematism was a result of his wide contextualisation of language 
that came in the codified shape of verbal, visual, and musical 
expression, and his “desire to explode these conventions and open 
up radically new creative possibilities.” (Chlenova, 2014, p.66). 
Malevich and the visual artists, writers, and composers around him 
regarded their newly-found language as material from which to build 
“a more immediate and more meaningful communication.” (Chlenova, 
2014, p.66). As Alexei Kruchonykh wrote in a founding manifesto of 
Zaum, “common language binds, free language allows for fuller 
expression.” (Kruchenykh, 1913, p.76). Artists across all registers 
were aiming at the renewal of perception, which was to be facilitated 
by the making-strange of language in its wider sense; for painters, 
this meant the subversion of automated vision, which would ultimately 
lead to the materialisation and coming-into-existence of the pictorial 
sign in relation to its referent. In other words, the sign would start 
adopting a life of its own. Roman Jakobson, founder of the Moscow 
Linguistic Circle and one of the founders of structuralism, called the 
pictorial signs palpable. The connotation of an underlying materiality 
is emphatically apparent. 
 
In an attempt to create Zaum in painting, Malevich, having worked 
through and overcome a number of –isms of art history in brisk 
fashion, turned to collages of inscriptions and collaged readymades; 
and it was the collage that eventually led him to the idea of isolating 
the colour planes that emerged in these works. The fruit of this labour 
manifested itself for the first time at the seminal exhibition 0.10 in 
Petrograd (St. Petersburg/Leningrad) in December 1915. The 
programmatic subtitle of the exhibition, “The Last Futurist Exhibition”, 
set the general tone: it was an end, and at the same time, a 
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beginning. Along with the Suprematist works, Malevich showed his 
now famous Black Square – and judging by the icon-like positioning 
of the painting, he was well aware of its gravitas: this was the “zero of 
painting”4 (Malevich, quoted in Foster, Krauss, Bois, Buchloh, 2004, 
p.131)5. 
 
A few years later, Alexander Rodchenko would arrive at an equally 
critical point of painting, but on a different trajectory. Whereas 
Malevich had tried to sever the ties of pictorial sign and referent along 
the lines of Zaum language, Rodchenko and the other Constructivists 
had a different agenda and tried to overcome “easelism” (i.e. 
basically any form of autonomous art object, be it painting or 
sculpture; see Foster, Krauss, Bois, Buchloh, 2004, p.174) in favour 
of production. The idea of Productivism developed, and construction 
was to replace composition. Every aspect of the work was to emerge 
from its material condition, not from its a priori conception; to a certain 
extent, Malevich and Rodchenko converged at this point: Malevich 
based his Suprematism on the “palpable” material that Zaum 
provided him with, thus abstracting from in-universe referents; 
Rodchenko and the Constructivists’ work was contingent on the 
material. Or, semiologically, “a construction was a ‘motivated’ sign, 
that is, its arbitrariness is limited, its form and meaning being 
                                                
4 I like this term because it remains open: painting as the beginning or the end; or even both. It 
addresses temporality by doing away with it, seeing as there is no before and after, only a now. 
It brings us into the present and presence of painting – this particular kind of painting, the 
monochrome. In a wider sense, it also reminds me of questions of cosmogony in that in its 
purest register, the monochrome is uniform, bereft of any differentiation, which echoes in the 
accounts of Creation across various religions: the monochrome is even less differentiated than 
for example formless and void Earth in the Bible: “In the beginning God created the heaven and 
the earth. And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the 
deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.” (The Bible, Genesis. 1:1, 1:2) 
Formlessness and void initially seem to indicate an absence of differentiation that resonates in 
the monochrome, but as Casey points out,  
 
“[n]ot only does ‘the deep’ … pre-exist creation, but it already has a ‘face’. The 
face itself is not superficial: it is the face of ‘of the waters,’ that is, of something 
quite elemental, and it is determinate enough to be moved over. In the 
beginning, then was an elemental mass having sufficient density and shape to 
be counterposed to the movement of the spirit … of God.” (Casey, 1998, p.12) 
 
Interestingly, the number of cosmogonic accounts that start from a status of absolute non-
differentiation is actually quite small in comparison with those that allow for at least some 
primordial form of differentiation. One account that seems to echo the monochrome is the slush 
of indetermination of the Ainu people of Japan (see Casey, 1998, p.11): “In the beginning the 
world was slush, for the waters and the mud were all stirred together. All was silence; there was 
no sound. It was cold.” (Leach, 1956, p.205) This seems to point to a situation that precedes 
place, a mass of nothingness without place. Placelessness entails lack of movement, lack of 
change. The idea of this cosmogonic monochrome is based on an absolute lack. This lack 
encompasses a set of concepts that are absent: differentiation, space/place, time, movement, 
change, shape/form, boundaries, thresholds: “the zero of painting”. 
5 The zero, as Staff (2015, p.11) points out, also comes up explicitly in a letter Malevich wrote to 
the composer Mikhail Vasilievich Matiushin in May 1915 where he claimed that “we intend to 
reduce everything to zero… [and] will then go beyond zero.” (Boersma, 1994, p.35). 
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determined (motivated) by the relationship between its various 
materials, … whereas a composition was ‘arbitrary’ “ (Foster, Krauss, 
Bois, Buchloh, 2004, p.177). Constructivists abhorred material excess 
in their work, an attitude that went hand in hand with the deductive 
nature of the work, which in turn resulted from material giving the 
primary impulse. In a painterly practice, this meant that at the end 
points of the practice, there was only the monochrome (or, arguably, 
the grid). Anything else would have given rise to pictorial composition 
and created excess space and illusion, which was squarely at odds 
with the notion of material efficiency. As a result, Rodchenko invoked 
the end of painting by showing his famous monochrome triptych at 
the 5 x 5 = 25 exhibition in 1921, Pure Red Colour, Pure Yellow 
Colour, Pure Blue Colour. Rodchenko deemed it “the last picture” and 
immediately moved on to work on the establishment of a Productivist 
platform with friends and fellow artists. 
 
One term that would repeatedly come up among the Russian avant-
garde was that of faktura. Containing a broader array of concepts 
than facture or fattura, faktura was first defined in the Russian context 
independently by David Burliuk (in his futurist manifesto “A Slap in the 
Face of Public Taste”) and by Mikhail Larionov (in his “Rayonnist 
Manifesto”), both in 1912. As outlined by Yves-Alain Bois (1976), 
Larionov argued that faktura was the essence of painting and, in a 
somewhat structuralist vein, pointed out that “the combination of 
colours, their density, their interaction, their depth, and their faktura 
would interest the truly concerned to the highest degree.”6 In a text 
titled “Faktura”, David Burliuk would differentiate between "a unified 
pictorial surface A and a differentiated pictorial surface B. The 
structure of a pictorial surface can be I. Granular, II. Fibrous, and III. 
Lamellar. I have carefully scrutinized Monet's Rouen Cathedral and I 
thought 'fibrous vertical structure.' … One can say that Cézanne is 
typically lamellar." Bois also points out countless references to faktura 
in Malevich’s writings, for example one passage where Malevich calls 
Cézanne “the inventor of a new faktura of the pictorial surface”. In 
1919, the constructivist artist Lyubov Popova made reference to the 
                                                
6
 
While this collection of definitions of faktura (please see also Burliuk’s ideas as outlined in the 
text above) seems to border on the tautological or evasive side, it seems that the term, 
especially when used by or in connection with the Russian avant-garde, cannot be pinned down 
to a stable definition, but instead changes (and indeed, expands) over the years. 
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relevance of the concept when she pointed out that “the content of 
pictorial surfaces is faktura”. And in his essay “Futurism”, the 
aforementioned Russian linguist and writer Roman Jakobson 
identified faktura as a strategy employed by avant-garde poets and 
painters who were concerned with the “unveiling of the procedure: 
therefore the increased concern for faktura; it no longer needs any 
justification, it becomes autonomous, it requires new methods of 
formation and new materials”. Jakobson’s assessment of faktura, with 
its focus on processes and didactics, is later echoed in the work of 
modernist artists such as Robert Ryman. It is no coincidence that 
Bois, in another essay, making reference to Ryman, quipped “Ask 
him why, [and] he’ll always answer how.” (1990)  
 
The definition of faktura was in constant flux during the second half of 
the 1910s while at the same time encompassing an ever-broadening 
scope of material connotations. In response to major technological 
progress during that time (e.g. the discovery of electromagnetic 
waves, the x-ray) and to theories vaguely footed in or around this field 
that were highly influential in Constructivists circles such as Wilhelm 
Ostwald’s energetism, the term started adopting both transformative 
and dialectic qualities: material was on the one hand assigned 
activating (i.e. transforming) characteristics in the viewer; faktura thus 
went beyond the realm of the work of art as such and started 
extending through the space of its environment to the viewer. And on 
the other hand, the “immaterial qualities of objects were of equal 
importance to their material properties and were designed to 
stimulate sensations and mediate experiences intended to 
communicate the cultural and social values of modern society” 
(Löschke, 2012, pp.93-94), thus setting up a dialectic of materiality 
and immateriality folded into material itself.  
 
It was in Hegel’s Aesthetics (Hegel, 2010, pp. 69-90) that material 
acquired proper physicality as central meaning for the first time. 
Hegel referred to Materie as physical matter in contrast to mind or 
spirit. With regard to the work of art, Hegel’s notion contained a split 
between material and content7. Via Marx and his definition of art as 
                                                
7 A split disregarded by modernism some 150 years later, when Carl Andre wrote his laconic 
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product of the material foundation, material in the work of art 
experienced further broadening amid the discourse of early-20th 
century on reproduction by, among others, Walter Benjamin. In the 
1940s, Clement Greenberg picked up on the material turn with his 
focus on the significance of the material and physicality in visual arts 
(at first, specifically avant-garde art)8; a stance that he later largely 
recanted by shifting his focus from the physical features of the 
medium of painting and its support, i.e. from materiality, to the 
question of the perceptual experience of the viewer – in other words, 
his account changed to a more phenomenologically inclined one9. 
Following Greenberg, Michael Fried pitted art against objecthood, or 
avant-garde art against minimalism. “Like the shape of the object, the 
materials do not represent, signify, or allude to anything; they are 
what they are and nothing more”, as he stated (Fried, 1967, p.22). 
Material had become the defining factor of what is art and what is not.  
 
The aforementioned material turn was facilitated, yet made more 
complex, by the ontological scrutiny the meaning of material had 
been put under by phenomenologists. Notably so by Martin 
Heidegger, who imposed a wide strand of meaning onto the word 
thing (Ding); at its widest extension, according to Heidegger, a thing 
was anything that was “a something not nothing” (Heidegger, 1971). 
Thus Heidegger effectively includes every conceivable category of 
being in the concept of thing, which goes beyond the realm of 
physicality and invites abstract meaning. As a result, the threshold of 
the material becomes blurred, and material can now refer to the 
abstract nature of things. One effect of this widening has been the 
emergence and popular use of the nominalised form of material, i.e. 
materiality, in the second half of the 20th century. It seems to capture 
material per se, i.e. the physical matter that was traditionally referred 
to by the term, plus something “beyond” that idea. Indeed, the 
                                                                                                                                                   
statement called “Preface to Stripe Painting” for Frank Stella: 
“Art excludes the unnecessary. Frank Stella has found it necessary to paint 
stripes. There is nothing else in his painting. Frank Stella is not interested in 
expression or sensitivity. He is interested in the necessities of painting. Symbols 
are counters passed among people. Frank Stella’s painting is not symbolic. His 
stripes are the paths of brush on canvas. These paths lead only into painting.” 
(Andre, 1959, p.76) 
8 As Foster, Krauss, Bois, and Buchloh explain, “Greenberg saw modernism’s 
acknowledgement of its medium as a form of materialist objectivity that this kind of painting 
shared with contemporary science.” (2004, p.441) 
9 In his 1960 essay “Modernist Painting”, Greenberg famously identified flatness as the 
distinctive feature, the area of competence of painting.  
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discourse about (new) media, and about art based on them, that has 
cropped up in recent decades has taken a significant cue from the 
Heideggerian conception of the material and things: the material that 
is immaterial. A prominent example of said media discourse 
manifested itself in the 1960s in Marshall McLuhan’s concept of 
media as extensions of man. In addition to physical matter, this notion 
of materiality includes any material that comes without a fixed or, in 
fact, any form, such as electricity. By emphasising the content of, for 
example, electric light, McLuhan highlights its materiality, despite 
what at first glance one perceives as bereft of content and of form. 
 
 
 
(Richard Zeiss: XXXVI, 2015, egg tempera and yacht varnish on 
tarpaulin, 155 x 155cm, backlit; at the RCA, London) 
 
The materiality of light enables people to create social spaces in the 
night, it facilitates and shapes human (inter-) action. In other words: 
we have come full circle to the Constructivists and faktura – 
“immaterial qualities of objects … of equal importance to their 
material properties … designed to stimulate sensations and mediate 
experiences intended to communicate the cultural and social values 
of modern society” (see also above, Löschke, 2012, pp.93-94). 
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McLuhan’s writings hinge on the claim that a medium itself, not the 
content it carries, should be the focus of study. In a Greenbergian 
world as laid out by Thierry de Duve (1998, chapter 4), “… anything in 
a work of art that can be talked about or pointed to automatically 
excludes itself from the ‘content’ of the work [and is therefore 
medium, or subject matter; author’s note] [and anything] that does not 
belong to its ‘content’ has to belong to its ‘form’ [i.e. medium, or 
subject matter; author’s note]“ (de Duve, 1998, p.210). Or in simpler 
terms: form (medium/subject matter) vs. content. McLuhan’s concept 
of materiality, when translated into art criticism, is therefore of a 
strongly formalist nature. That being said, his take on Cubism, which 
according to him clearly announced that the medium was the 
message, comes with a strong undercurrent of phenomenological 
totalisation: Cubist art required “instant awareness of the whole” 
(McLuhan, 1994, p.13). The artwork had to be considered in its 
entirety. 
 
In 1985, Jean-Francois Lyotard organised the exhibition “Les 
Immatériaux” at the Centre George Pompidou in Paris. In an interview 
he gave in the run-up to the exhibition, Lyotard seems to be picking 
up a thread that we first encountered in connection with the question 
of material vs. immaterial among the Constructivists: the borders 
between material and immaterial have become increasingly blurred, 
to an extent where, on the back of the discoveries in physics over the 
past 100 years, everything ultimately is energy – the “immaterial turn” 
within the material turn: 
 
“The exhibition also has another theme that tries to give 
legitimacy to this ‘monstrous neologism - the immaterials’; 
we make the point, obviously enough, that all of the 
progress that has been accomplished in the sciences, and 
perhaps in the arts as well, is strictly connected to an ever 
closer knowledge of what we generally call objects. 
(Which can also be a question of objects of thought.) And 
so analysis decomposes these objects and makes us 
perceive that, finally, there can only be considered to be 
objects at the level of a human point of view; at their 
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constitution or structural level, they are only a question of 
complex agglomerates of tiny packets of energy, or of 
particles that can’t possibly be grasped as such. Finally, 
there’s no such thing as matter, and the only thing that 
exists is energy; we no longer have any such thing as 
materials, in the old sense of the word that implied an 
object that offered resistance to any kind of project that 
attempted to alienate it from it (sic!) primary finalities.” 
(Lyotard, 1985, p.4) 
 
In their 1968 essay “The dematerialization of art”, Lucy Lippard and 
John Chandler identified the dematerialisation of art as it was edging 
towards the ultra-conceptual end of the spectrum; this form of art 
“emphasizes the thinking process almost exclusively” (Lippard and 
Chandler, 1968, p.34). They went on to caution that, 
 
“[as] more and more work is designed in the studio but 
executed elsewhere by professional craftsmen, as the 
object becomes merely the end product, a number of 
artists are losing interest in the physical evolution of the 
work of art. … Such trend appears to be provoking a 
profound dematerialization of art, especially of art as 
object, and if it continues to prevail, it may result in the 
object’s becoming wholly obsolete.” (Lippard and 
Chandler, 1968, p.35) 
 
I would argue that this quote actually illustrates an understanding of 
materiality that does not do full justice to the width that Heidegger’s 
concept of the thing (Ding) afforded it. In their example, the process 
chain is lengthened, integrated, and it contains a wider spectrum of 
material ramifications, much like in Robert Ryman’s work. The 
physicality is still there – it just is at a different place. The case gets 
more complex, of course, if the dematerialisation occurs all the way 
through to the presentation of the work, with the presentation, or 
indeed incarnation, of ideas bordering on the absence of any form of 
materiality even in its widest, generally accepted sense. Similar to 
Malevich’s Black Square invoking the idea of zero-degree painting, 
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ultra-conceptual art in its liminal state would invoke the notion of zero-
degree materiality. 
 
Where Lippard and Chandler converge with Lyotard’s thoughts on 
dematerialisation and immateriality, respectively, is the focus on the 
dramaturgy of information, the importance of presentation. Lyotard, in 
preparing the exhibition “Les Immatériaux”, insisted that the aim of 
the exhibition was “to make visible, even palpable (and so ‘present’) a 
kind of ‘post-industrial’ techno-scientific condition” (Rajchman, 2009, 
p.2). Notably, in his essay Rajchmann uses the term “palpable” (in 
translation) after it earlier emerged in connection with Roman 
Jakobson, the Russian linguist, who used it to illustrate the material 
nature of the pictorial signs that the transrational language Zaum 
facilitated. It would seem that there has been an underlying, and over 
the decades frequently re-emerging, agreement ever since Russian 
avant-garde’s focus on faktura according to which not only can 
materiality contain the immaterial, but the immaterial itself can almost 
have a certain sense of tactility to it. As Rajchman (2009, p.3) points 
out, “In Lyotard’s labyrinthine theatre of the new … ‘condition’ of 
information, ‘immateriality’ was no longer conceived in terms of 
freeing concepts or ideas from all materials, but, on the contrary, of 
shifting the idea of ‘materiality’ away from that of ‘formed matter’ 
(including the ‘modernist’ distinction between form and content) and 
towards the ‘techno-sciences’ and the city.” Lyotard’s tactility is an 
urban one, defying Greenberg’s and Fried’s concepts of modernism 
and its self-referential materiality. At the same time his project 
substantiates the link as much as the blurred nature of the borders 
between the material and the immaterial; indeed, it goes further than 
that and questions that dialectic within materiality (in the sense that 
perhaps there should not be a DIA-lectic, but a multi-lectic of sorts, 
along a continuous scale of materiality vs. immateriality). 
 
 
 18 
AGNES MARTIN 
 
Though unlikely, questions of materiality that are manifest in the 
Russian avant-garde and early monochromes can also be identified 
in the work of Agnes Martin. As Rosenberger explains about Martin’s 
work:  
 
“Perhaps it is because narratives, particularly teleological 
narratives, simply do not register with regard to her 
paintings. Unlike Reinhardt, she did not continually refine 
her approach in order to create an ultimate expression – a 
‘first’ or a ‘last’ painting. Nor was her goal the reduction of 
form or material effects to their logical conclusion… The 
particularity of Martin’s paintings was not achieved solely 
by her hand-drawn lines, as many have suggested; 
instead it was the sum of her decisions about the material 
facture [my emphasis] of her paintings that bore the 
unique effects of the work.” (Rosenberger, 2011, p.112-
113) 
 
Although I have pointed out earlier that the Russian term faktura 
exceeded its English counterpart, facture, in terms of expanse (NB. to 
what extent it was doing so at any point in time remains only vaguely 
defined at best, seeing the ever-shifting and never fully defined 
nature of the term faktura), Rosenberger’s focus on the “material 
facture” comes across as lynchpin of her argument. And it is when 
Rosenberger concedes that “Martin is often thought of as a painter of 
diaphanous acrylic washes, thinned and dematerialized” (2011, 
p.108) that the expanded field, the immaterial of the material shines 
through and sets up a link with faktura as known and used by the 
Russian avant-garde. Rosenberger’s essay is in fact not the only one 
that takes the materiality in Agnes Martin’s work as its cornerstone 
(see below for a discussion of Michael Newman’s essay that 
originates from a similar starting point). This is why I would claim that 
the – at first glance – unlikely line of investigation (Malevich, 
Rodchenko, Martin) is actually not an extroverted choice as much as 
it explores questions of materiality that have emerged in the work of 
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these artists. Malevich and Rodchenko ended up with the 
monochrome on their trajectory of material enquiry. Agnes Martin 
takes a conscious step away from the undifferentiated, formless 
monochrome and engages with the grid – the other archetypically 
form of modernist aesthetic expression, where tabula rasa and the 
last painting meet (although, as discussed above, not as part of any 
teleological project of her own).  
 
Agnes Martin would sit in her rocking chair and wait for inspiration, 
sometimes for hours. Inspiration would come to her in the form of a 
stamp-sized version of the finished painting in her mind (a story told 
by Arne Glimcher in conversation with Frances Morris at Tate Modern 
(2013)). The stamp-sized, perfect picture in her mind had to be 
translated into the format of the canvas – 72 x 72 inches at first, until 
1995, when she changed to 60 x 60 inches. To this end, she would 
do pages of calculations that contained the fractions she needed for 
her canvases to reference the idea in her mind. She would put two 
layers of gesso on and then sketch out the lines. As Rosenberger 
points out, Martin “described herself as a ‘pretty speedy painter’, [but] 
her attention to scale suggests a creative process based on the 
careful deliberation through which the possibilities of her material 
elements were utilized to produce precise formal structures.” (2011, 
p.106) Along similar lines, and with reference to the transformation 
process from Martin’s idea into the finished canvas, Wilson (1966, 
p.46) observes that “pencilled lines and corrections show the painter 
correcting the canvas, according to some visions that exist 
independently of the canvas. The vision is not discovered in the act of 
painting… The image in her mind is brought total to the canvas.” And 
with respect to the materiality of one of Martin’s paintings, Wilson 
says 
 
“Martin makes great use of the fabric of her canvas. 
These paintings are in the grain, with the grain… The 
precise small linear imprints that make up the large 
central geometric forms appear… out of the fabric, which 
is plain ground of deftly tinted with pale textured 
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grounds… Agnes Martin’s paintings seem to grow out of 
the fabric.” (Wilson, 1966, p.47) 
 
The monochrome might be considered suspended in time, or indeed, 
before time. This is Agnes Martin’s point of departure as she 
introduces the subtlest traces of pictorial decision-making into her 
works. Her traces expand into delicate lines, and these lines in turn 
take the monochrome out of its temporally suspended state twofold: 
Martin infuses the work with time by taking it through a lengthy, 
traceable process; every line of her pencil testament to the seconds, 
minutes, and hours spent on it, indeed, she seems to create time 
lines as she is moving horizontally and vertically across the canvas. 
And the same painterly decisions generate a form of differentiation 
that the monochrome does not offer: the void formlessness of the 
monochrome is put into a dialogue with, and juxtaposed by, traces, 
marks, and lines. Where there is differentiation, there is place. And 
with place, there comes time. Martin thus lifts the monochrome out of 
its temporal suspension. 
 
Martin in turn could be thought of as suspended in her own utopian 
quest for ideal states of existence and perfection for each painting 
she made. Hers was not a teleological project (in contrast to, for 
example, Ad Reinhardt, as Rosenberger (2011, p.112) points out). In 
Martin’s own words: “One must see the Ideal in one’s own mind. It is 
like a memory of perfection” (Martin quoted in Cooke, 2011, p.11). 
The quest for perfection is indeed a leitmotif running through Martin’s 
process as well: she would destroy any work that fell short of her own 
standards, regardless of how much praise it might have garnered 
from others: “[I destroy paintings] as I go along. My inspiration is an 
image in my mind that I can see and I try to paint it. If I don’t get the 
exact scale it’s no good.” (Martin, quoted in Eauclaire, 1993, p.17)10 
Critics have always been quick to laud Martin’s work for its alleged 
simplicity, pointing out the lyrical, reduced, and spiritual qualities of 
her work11. However, I wonder whether this tendency might not also 
                                                
10 In a conversation at Tate Modern, Glimcher (2013) called her “the best editor of work of any 
artist who ever lived.” 
11 While Lynne Cooke made reference to Martin’s “narrowed syntax” and her “… astonishing 
spareness” (2004, Introduction), Hilton Kramer suggested that Martin’s paintings were “almost a 
form of prayer” (1976). Yet at the same time, due to the transcendent character that critics have 
attributed to her work, the physical features of her paintings tend to take a backseat when it 
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have to do with the fact that an engagement with the materiality, 
indeed the faktura, in Martin’s work may initially not seem as obvious 
and compelling as the focus on its aforementioned, less tangible but 
probably more often vocalised aspects of a spiritual and 
transcendental nature. Describing it as “an oscillation in the optic 
nerve”, Peter Schjeldahl comes to the conclusion that analysing the 
facture in Martin’s work is “a conceptual traffic jam: sheer 
undecidability. My analytic faculties, after trying to conclude that what 
I’m looking at is one thing or another, give up, and my mind collapses 
into a momentary engulfing state that is either ‘spiritual’ or nameless.” 
(Schjeldahl, 2004, p.95) 
 
Michael Newman’s essay “Phenomenality and Materiality in Agnes 
Martin” (2011) is a central piece of critical writing when it comes to 
the analysis of materiality in Agnes Martin’s work. The title is a nod to 
Paul de Man’s essay, “Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant” 
(1996)12. Newman bases the initial part of his essay on Rosalind 
Krauss’s reading of Agnes Martin’s work (“Agnes Martin: The 
/Cloud/”, 1992), which in turn hinges critically on the 
phenomenological approach pursued by Kasha Linville in her own 
text (“Agnes Martin: An Appreciation”, 1971). Newman, much like this 
short canon quoted, recalls his own experience when looking at 
Martin’s work. As he says, he finds himself “moving back and forth, 
coming close to inspect the surface, then moving across the painting 
… . Then I step back, moving gradually about eight feet or so away to 
take in the painting as a whole. …” (2011, p.199). This echoes 
Krauss’s tripartite account of materiality/atmosphere/opacity in Agnes 
Martin, a distinction that equally results from varying distances of 
viewing the work: “the materiality of the canvas and graphite lines 
from close up, the moment when illusion takes over (not spatial 
                                                                                                                                                   
comes to critical reception and analysis. Brendan Prendeville for example points out the 
“rudimentary material facts that one might otherwise treat as beneath regard” (2008, p.64). As 
Christina Bryan Rosenberger pointedly says, “The wonder, it seems, is that so much expression 
can be conjured from so little material substance.” (2011, p.103). One critic who did focus on 
the materiality of Martin’s work was Thomas McEvilley, claiming that “[at] the heart of Martin’s 
work is the dichotomy between an ordered system and a particular event within that system – 
the personal feeling of the lines, which proceed over the surface with a heartbreaking delicacy 
of touch” (1987, p.94). While this analysis clearly carries connotations of tactility, McEvilley’s 
approach to the materiality of the paintings also problematically allows the projections of the 
viewer’s subjective consciousness to take over, as Michael Newman (2011, p.224, FN 3) rightly 
points out. 
12 The popularity of this essay manifests itself not the least in the fact that yet another essay had 
come out before Newman’s above-cited work with a title that played on Paul de Man’s original 
work, i.e. T.J. Clark’s “Phenomenality and Materiality in Cézanne” (2001). 
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illusion but an atmosphere, like mist), then the point at which the lines 
are lost and the painting, according to Linville, quoted by Krauss 
‘closes down entirely, becoming completely opaque.’ ” (Linville and 
Krauss quoted in Newman, 2011, p.199). Krauss rejects readings of 
Martin’s work that by interpreting landscape and transcendence 
invoke the abstract sublime and thus attribute to landscape and 
transcendence the role of the signified of the painting’s aesthetic 
manifestations. Instead, she claims that “atmosphere” in Martin’s 
paintings functions not as a signified, but as a signifier. It does not 
stand on its own, but relates to other signifiers. It stands for 
something else. Krauss then proceeds to identify the signifier 
/atmosphere/ as the “optical” that is bracketed by the “tactile” 
moments of materiality in Martin’s work, i.e. the woven surface (up 
close) and the square panel (from afar)13. Newman resists Krauss’s 
somewhat static reading here, pointing at the transitionality and 
fluency involved in the experience of Martin’s paintings. The material 
dominates, or insists, up to a certain (vantage) point, from which 
onwards the painting becomes optical, or phenomenal. These liminal 
regions carry a particular degree of “edge”, a kind of dynamism that is 
brought about by being suspended for an instant in the in-between. 
 
At this point, and in line with the discussion of materiality vs. 
phenomenality, Newman introduces two kinds of materiality into his 
account. The dichotomy of subjective projection14 and materiality that 
is indifferent to the subject, that resists said projection raises the 
question of what the relationship is between the experience of the 
former vs. the latter. How does the materiality resisting 
phenomenological projection relate to the differential nature of 
signifiers such as /atmosphere/? “[Signification] resulting from the 
difference between terms does not depend on the sensuous qualities 
of those terms. The materiality of the signifiers in its difference is not 
the same as the materiality of ‘stuff’” (Newman, 2011, p.202).  
 
In Greenberg’s optical (rather than tactile; see Krauss, above) 
account of modernist painting that defines itself through what it is not 
                                                
13 She does so by bringing in Alois Riegl’s account of a late Roman bronze belt buckle (Riegl, 
1988). 
14 Newman refers to “perceptual intentionality” (2011, p.201). 
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– for example, sculpture – he still resorts to a material basis: 
flatness15. He thus sets it up in a field of oscillation between 
phenomenal experience and the materiality that makes it possible yet 
resists (or escapes) it: the painting as signifier and, at the same time, 
material practice. Does the resistance of materiality depend on the 
notion of phenomenal experience as largely or exclusively optical? 
Greenberg points out that painting is restricted by conventions that 
prevent the reintroduction of three-dimensional space. The question 
is whether such an illusion can ever be totally avoided, whether total 
flatness can ever be absolute. “The first mark made on a canvas 
destroys its literal and utter flatness, and the result of the marks made 
on it by an artist like Mondrian is still a kind of illusion that suggests a 
kind of third dimension. Only now is it strictly pictorial, strictly optical 
third dimension.” (Greenberg, 1960, p.90) Greenberg argues a case 
for the purely optical, or visual, character of painting. This is where 
Krauss disagrees, having introduced the aforementioned notion of 
tactility into her account. The introduction of tactility renders opticality 
less totalising and less diametrically opposed to non-relational 
materiality (see below).  
 
In the second half of his essay, Newman subjects Martin’s work to an 
analysis based on Paul de Man’s concept of pure, radical 
materiality16. This concept originates in de Man’s essay delivered as 
lecture, “Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant” (1983), where he 
constructed an alternative reading of Kant’s account of the failure of 
the imagination to create an image of the greatest magnitude or the 
overwhelmingly powerful in the mathematical or the dynamic sublime, 
respectively. According to de Man, that failure does not reveal the 
freedom of human reason, but a level of radical materiality “that is 
neither phenomenal (that is, a matter of intuition and consciousness) 
nor empirical (in the “metaphysical” sense of externally caused)” 
                                                
15 “It was the stressing of the ineluctable flatness of the surface that remained, however, more 
fundamental than anything else to the process by which pictorial art criticized and defined itself 
under Modernism. For flatness alone was unique and exclusive to pictorial art.” (Greenberg, 
1960, p.87) 
16 Newman uses several cognates for this idea of pure and/or radical materiality, including (but 
not limiting himself to) inscribed materiality, nonrelational materiality, bare materiality, and 
indifferent materiality. The variety of registers results from the scope of arguments through 
which he is taking the reader, and while, when taken out of context, the sheer number of 
different terms he uses to navigate de Man’s rather limited set of definitions may seem 
excessive, Newman’s choice of terminology is supportive to the respective context. To the 
extent that it helps the argument, I will be switching between de Man’s original terminology and 
Newman’s derived cognates. 
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(Newman, 2011, pp. 208-209). As a linguist, de Man sees this 
materiality emerge on the back of the three dimensions of language: 
de Man calls them the phenomenalised dimension, i.e. the reading 
where we form images in our mind (N.B. this level is made possible 
by rhetorical tropes); the semiological dimension, which refers to the 
structures of linguistic differentiation, e.g. grammar (N.B. this 
dimension is autonomous and without semantic depth); and lastly, the 
dimension of pure inscription. This is non-relational materiality, and it 
is necessarily forgotten in both phenomenal dimension and 
attentiveness to structural ties. We get the notion of pre-existence; 
and Newman points out that it is not part of the consciousness and 
might well be regarded as inhuman. While Paul de Man comes from 
the area of the text, Newman suggests that this concept of radical, 
indifferent materiality can also be brought to bear on Agnes Martin’s 
work.  
 
In the mathematical sublime, Kant differentiates between two acts of 
imagination: apprehension, which is successive, and comprehension, 
which is totalising. With growing apprehension comes a more difficult 
comprehension17. The experience of Martin’s paintings can be read 
along those lines: as the number of lines perceived increases, the 
point where we cannot apprehend both the accumulation of lines 
individually and the painting as a whole any more. "In an aesthetic 
comprehension, totalisation must be given in a single intuition” 
(Newman, 2011, p.209). This becomes increasingly impossible in this 
example. De Man compares this experience of the mathematical 
sublime to the phenomenal process of reading a text in which “the 
eye moves horizontally in succession whereas the mind has to 
combine vertically the cumulative understanding of what has been 
apprehended.” (de Man, 1983, p.77)  
 
                                                
17 “To take in a quantum intuitively in the imagination so as to be able to use it as a measure, or 
unit for estimating magnitude by numbers, involves two operations of this faculty: apprehension 
(apprehensio) and comprehension (comprehensio aesthetica). Apprehension presents no 
difficulty: for this process can be carried on ad infinitum; but with the advance of apprehension, 
comprehension becomes more difficult at every step and soon attains its maximum, and this is 
the aesthetically greatest fundamental measure for the estimation of magnitude. For if the 
apprehension has reached a point beyond which the representations of sensuous intuition in the 
case of the parts first apprehended begin to disappear from the imagination as this advances to 
the apprehension of yet others, as much, then, is lost at one end as is gained at the other, and 
for comprehension we get a maximum which the imagination cannot exceed.” (Kant, 1978, 
pp.124-125) 
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(Agnes Martin: Friendship, 1963, gold leaf and gesso on canvas, 191 
x 191cm) 
 
The oscillating appearance and disappearance of the materiality of 
the letter in the process of reading addressed above (“non-relational 
materiality”) and the experience of Agnes Martin’s paintings offer 
striking similarities. The materiality of the letter has to be forgotten in 
order for the reading process (the “totalisation”) not to stall. Otherwise 
the letters cannot carry the meaning inscribed into their combinations. 
Indeed, de Man argues for a non-perceptual, linguistic moment in 
painting: “… learn to read pictures rather than to imagine meaning” 
(de Man, 1986, p. 10, original emphasis). In comparison to more 
phenomenal accounts of “reading”, i.e. interpreting, a picture put 
forward for example by Didi-Huberman18, de Man suggests a non-
phenomenal reading that refrains from using words to conjure up 
images in the mind but instead adheres to the materiality of the letter. 
The question arises of course how this sort of non-phenomenal 
                                                
18 While Didi-Huberman does somewhat converge with de Man in terms of the simile of 
“reading” pictures, he takes issue with the notion of discretely defined, underlying entities such 
as letters existing in pictures that can be pinned down: “One of the most obvious theoretical 
problems posed by painting is that the treasure of the signifier is neither truly universal nor truly 
extant prior to speech, as is the case with language and writing. The minimal unities here are 
not given but produced, and moreover, not being truly discreet, like the letters of a word, for 
example, they pertain neither to a syntax nor to a vocabulary in the strict sense. And yet there 
are here treasures, structures, meanings.” (Didi-Huberman, 2005, p.263) 
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materiality can be seen, i.e. apprehended. Here it is crucial to 
remember that de Man thinks that the phenomenalisation into images 
through words works on the basis of linguistic tropes or figures of 
speech19. De Man claims to locate non-tropological “material vision” 
in Kant’s account of the sublime. This would be a form of vision that 
does not rely on tropes, on the assignment of any, say, metaphorical 
content to an object. Here, de Man moves from the mathematical to 
the dynamic sublime and highlights the way Kant introduces the kind 
of seeing called on when “objects in nature are susceptible of 
producing sublime effects [are] considered in a radically 
nonteleological manner, completely detached from any purpose or 
interest that the mind may find in them” (de Man, 1983, p.80):  
 
“If, then, we call the sight of the starry heaven sublime, we 
must not place at the foundation of judgement concepts of 
worlds inhabited by rational beings and regard the bright 
points, with which we see the space above us as filled, as 
their suns moving in circles purposively fixed with 
reference to them; but we must regard it, just as we see it 
…, as a distant, all-embracing vault. … To find the ocean 
nevertheless sublime we must regard it as poets do …, 
merely by what the eye reveals … – if it is at rest, as a 
clear mirror of water only bounded by the heavens; if it is 
stormy, as an abyss threatening to overwhelm 
everything.” (Kant quoted in de Man, 1983, p.80) 
 
In resorting to Kant’s concept of Augenschein20, de Man introduces 
the idea of an appearing to the eye without intervention of the mind. 
“No mind is involved in the Kantian vision of ocean and heaven,” as 
de Man insists (1983, p.82), and he substantiates this claim with the 
tautology inherent in the term Augenschein, which contains both the 
eye itself and what appears to the eye. This form of appearing is what 
de Man refers to as a “material vision” (1983, p.82) and continues 
“The sea is called a mirror, not because it is supposed to reflect 
anything, but to stress a flatness devoid of any suggestions of depth. 
                                                
19 For example prosopopeia, i.e. the personification and attribution of voice to objects; as well as 
metaphors, conceits, similes etc. 
20 German for, literally translated, “the appearance to the eye”, or “as it appears to the eye” 
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In the same way and to the same extent that this vision is purely 
material, devoid of any reflective or intellectual complication, it is also 
purely formal, devoid of any semantic depth and reducible to the 
formal mathematization or geometrization of pure optics.” (de Man, 
1983, p.83) “Seeing them as meaningful,” adds J. Hillis Miller in his 
essay “Paul de Man as Allergen” (2001, p.191), “would occur, for 
example, when we view the sea as reservoir of edible fish, or the sky 
as a producer of life-giving rain.” 
 
De Man’s concept of material vision takes Kant’s critique of the 
aesthetic into a “formal materialism that runs counter to all values and 
characteristics associated with aesthetic experience” (de Man, 1983, 
p.83). It is formal because of its lack of meaning and semantic depth. 
To this extent it is a bare form of materiality. De Man wonders how 
the concrete representation of ideas can be reconciled with pure 
ocular vision, and claims that what is at stake here is what he calls 
the “incarnational” conception of the aesthetic21: the work of art is 
regarded as an organically unified body, either literally (e.g. as a 
figurative sculpture), or metaphorically. This is where de Man’s late 
tendency towards a reading that predicates on dismemberment 
comes in, as he refuses to consider art or literature as symbolic unity 
or materially incarnated idea: we have to “disarticulate, mutilate the 
body… We must consider our limbs the way the primitive man 
considered the house, entirely severed from any purpose or use” (de 
Man, 1983, p.88). Putting text under scrutiny, what follows is the 
dismemberment of language: “… as meaning-producing tropes are 
replaced by the fragmentation of sentences and propositions into 
discrete words, or the fragmentation of words into syllables or finally 
                                                
21 De Man points out that in  
“the businesslike world of morality, even the free and playful imagination 
becomes an instrument of work. Its task, its labor, is precisely to translate the 
abstractions of reason back into the phenomenal world of appearances and 
images whose presence is retained in the very word imagination, Bild, in the 
German Einbildungskraft [power of imagination; translation mine]. Why this 
incarnation of the idea has to occur is accounted for in various ways. It is, first of 
all, a quasi-theological necessity that follows necessarily from our fallen 
condition. The need for aesthetic judgment and activity, although it defines man, 
is the expression of a shortcoming, of a curse rather than of an excess of power 
and inventiveness.” (De Man, 1983, p.84) Note that Einbildungskraft is usually 
translated as “power of imagination”. The interesting aspect is that in its most 
literal translation though, it would be the “power of unifying into one image”, 
based on the fact that, while Einbildung is generally read as imagination (i.e. the 
creation of an image or images), it literally and very specifically means 
“unification into one (“ein”) image”, or “establishing one image”. One could 
argue that the term “imagination” has thus already achieved a higher degree of 
linguistic phenomenalisation or totalisation. 
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letters” (de Man, 1983, p.89). Following de Man, it is here that the 
materiality of Augenschein becomes the “prosaic materiality of the 
letter” (de Man, 1983, p.90). 
 
How can we apply this form of dismemberment in Agnes Martin’s 
paintings? The parallel lines in Martin’s works can arguably be seen 
as form of dismemberment: on the one hand, the drawn lines carry 
the history of drawing as a practice (e.g. of the body of a human 
subject or any other 3-D shape); on the other hand, the drawing of 
parallel lines or a grid takes apart, dismembers the memory of that 
history by moulding it into form, i.e. formalising it, just like written 
letters are both constituent and dismemberment of the word22. 
Remembering Krauss’s earlier account of Linville’s three distances 
and the conversion of the signified atmosphere into the signifier 
/atmosphere/, Newman sees both disarticulation and dismemberment 
as given in Martin’s work: disarticulation as the “unsynthesizability of 
proximate and distant views” (Newman, 2011, p.213), and 
dismemberment of the embodiment of drawing. 
 
                                                
22 Note that the act of drawing serves as embodiment. 
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INSCRIPTION 
 
Following de Man’s rationale, Agnes Martin’s lines are meaningless 
inscriptions, like letters in a text23. They come without semantic depth, 
and in their uniformity of execution shun rhetorical tropes (see above, 
the “phenomenalised dimension”). That being said, there are of 
course numerous readings of Martin’s work, not the least nurtured by 
a certain tendency to read Martin’s own writings, that interpret them 
along the lines of natural, or indeed, transcendental references in 
spite of the formal materialism of the paintings. Newman holds that 
this contributes to the tension they exude: the relationship of material 
inscription (like the letters of a text) and (or, versus) natural 
phenomena projected by a subject – “The material inscriptions make 
possible the tropological references while at the same time undoing 
them, because in themselves they have no relation to meaning and, 
as signifiers, have no intrinsic qualities whatsoever” (Newman, 2011, 
p.212). The materiality in Agnes Martin’s paintings thus emerges 
between the failure to totalise, phenomenalise them as viewer and 
the non-relational material turn facilitated by the material inscription 
that harks back to de Man’s idea of the role of letters in text. 
 
De Man locates the idea of inscription at the level of pure materiality 
of a text. It is the kind of inscribed nonrelational materiality that 
Newman talks about in connection with Agnes Martin and that has to 
be forgotten in favour of the other two dimensions of language: the 
phenomenalised or tropological dimension and the semiological 
dimension. There is something primordial, something forever 
preceding yet eluding about this idea of non-phenomenal materiality, 
as de Man develops it, while re-reading Kant, out of Derrida’s notion 
of originary writing, the inscription that has always already been 
there. Derrida equates grammar with writing as a system of 
inscription24. This system precedes any individual effort of linguistic 
production. Writing does not rely on a point of origin. It relies on the 
                                                
23 In the context I am setting up here, they are “meaningless” individually to the extent that their 
meaning can only be unlocked upon assembly (phenomenalisation). So strictly speaking, they 
are not entirely bare of meaning in that they carry unrelated, elementary building blocks of 
meaning in them from the beginning (or, following Derrida (see below), they have always had 
them inscribed without an actual beginning as such). Access to them is via the phenomenon, to 
paraphrase the earlier account of pure materiality. 
24 “De la Grammatologie” (1967; bibliography: 1976, translated) 
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possibility of inscription as a generally available option, referred to as 
“arche-writing” – a writing without origin25.  
 
In his “Confessions” (1979), de Man talks about the machine-like, 
formalist ruthlessness of pre-inscribed patterns, which ultimately 
takes us back to the idea of the not-yet-phenomenalised level of 
language, i.e. in de Man’s mind, the territory of letters constitutive of 
pure materiality. 
 
“By saying that the excuse is not only a fiction but also a 
machine one adds to the connotation of referential 
detachment, of gratuitous improvisation, that of the 
implacable repetition of a preordained pattern. Like 
Kleist’s marionettes, the machine is both ‘anti-grav’, the 
anamorphosis of a form detached from meaning and 
capable of taking on any structure whatever, yet entirely 
ruthless in its inability to modify its own structural design 
for nonstructural reasons. The machine is like the 
                                                
25 Derrida argued that the so-called linguistic turn in twentieth century philosophy was crucial to 
the emergence of the science of grammatology. Following on from the linguistic turn and in the 
context of Derrida’s work, A. Bradley suggests a “scriptural turn” (Bradley, 2008, p.52) that 
acted as a catalyst for Derrida’s thought about writing. At the time of preparing “Of 
Grammatology”, Derrida was able to observe numerous examples of this scriptural turn within a 
vast array of fields, i.e. not only within philosophy, but also in life and cognitive sciences: the 
genetic code (or script) of the DNA; and more importantly, cybernetic theory. Derrida took 
particular interest in the sort of systems that were structured by inscription. The coding or 
programming lodged in systems of biology and cybernetics, for example, inverts the logocentric 
structure (i.e., in Derrida’s terms, the way in which the philosophical, literary, and cultural 
discourses of the West privilege certain terms in a text at the expense or exclusion of others 
and thus suggests a stable or central meaning of text that actually does not exist) of spoken 
versus written discourse by regarding language as a sub-species of the more general concept 
of writing, as opposed to the other way around. Derrida considers writing the originary condition 
of language (in the original referred to as arche-écriture, with “arche-writing” and “originary 
writing” representing its increasingly translated equivalents); his point here is a logical one, not a 
chronological one. As Bradley (2008, p.54) explains,  
 
“Derrida is going to argue that a certain idea of ‘writing’ is not simply a linguistic 
condition but rather approaches the status of something like an ontological 
condition: what we understand as consciousness, culture, and (if molecular 
biology is to be believed) even the very building blocks of life itself are 
structured according to the principles of mediation, difference and relation that 
for the last two millennia have been synonymous with ‘writing’ alone. In this 
sense, too, we cannot see writing as something that arrives on the scene after 
an original state – speech, nature, or presence – because it is already there at 
the origin itself. (Bradley, 2008, p.54 [emphasis in the original]) 
 
Given that writing is already there in the beginning, Derrida, with his concept of originary writing, 
does not attempt to define a new point of origin. Rather, he subverts the idea of an absolute 
origin to begin with by unhinging any pure form of historical, theological, or philosophical “point 
of ‘presence’ to which everything can be traced back” (Bradley, 2008, p.55). Cybernetics is a 
case in point: here, writing undermines the metaphysical project of establishing absolute 
hierarchies geared towards the institution of an original presence. The question of where a 
cybernetic system begins is, in philosophical terms, a kind of category error. A cybernetic 
system is a feedback loop, an “originary complex” (Bradley, 2008, p.55) with no beginning and 
no end and continuously moves information around. The “origin” of cybernetics and other 
grammatologies consists of an originary state of relation rather than a simple ground or point, 
i.e. a singularity. Derrida calls it “an element without simplicity” (Derrida, 1976, p.9). 
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grammar of the text when it is isolated from its rhetoric, 
the merely formal element without which no text can be 
generated. There can be no use of language which is not, 
within a certain perspective thus radically formal, i.e. 
mechanical, no matter how deeply this aspect may be 
concealed by aesthetic, formalistic delusions.” (de Man, 
1979, p.294) 
 
Here we have de Man’s allusion to a “ruthless machine”26, an allusion 
that ties together the notions of inscribed materiality in the letter and 
Derrida’s idea of grammar as machine that is at the heart of linguistic 
production. It is this idea of the ruthless machine following formal 
necessities that also reverberates in a piece of literature that takes 
the idea of inscription to the extreme, while arguably touching on 
incarnation and dismemberment, i.e. Franz Kafka’s “Penal Colony”27. 
 
In Kafkas’s text, the prisoner does not know his sentence. He is 
supposed to learn it on his body, in a long and terrifyingly inhuman 
procedure of inscription. Curiously that term, inhuman, strikes a chord 
with how Michael Newman describes de Man’s discussion of the 
letter: “As pure inscriptions, letters are senseless and distinct, each 
without relation to the others. This inscribed nonrelational materiality 
is necessarily forgotten in both phenomenal reading and reflexive 
attentiveness to structural relations – it is not a matter of 
consciousness, and one might even say inhuman.” (Newman, 2011, 
p.209) 
                                                
26 “Ruthless machine” – a term that Derrida uses in his discussion of de Man (2001, p.307). 
27 The crucial passage:  
“ ‘Whatever commandment the prisoner has disobeyed is written upon his body 
by the Harrow. This prisoner, for instance … will have written on his body: 
HONOR THY SUPERIORS!’ … Many questions were troubling the explorer, but 
at the sight of the prisoner he asked only: ‘Does he know his sentence?’ …’No,’ 
said the officer… ‘There would be no point in telling him. He’ll learn it on his 
body.’ 
‘[T]here are two kinds of needles arranged in multiple patterns, Each long 
needle has a short one beside it. The long needle does the writing, and the 
short needles sprays a jet of water to wash away the blood and keep the 
inscription clear. Blood and water together are then conducted here through 
small runnels into this main runnel and down a waste pipe into the pit. … The 
Harrow is beginning to write; when it finishes the first draft of the inscription on 
the man’s back, the layer of cotton wool begins to roll and slowly turns the body 
over, to give the Harrow fresh space for writing. Meanwhile the raw part that has 
been written on lies on the cotton wool, which is specially prepared to staunch 
the bleeding and so makes all ready for a new deepening of the script. Then 
these teeth at the edge of the Harrow, as the body turns further around, tear the 
cotton wool away from the wounds, throw it into the pit, and there is more work 
for the Harrow. So it keeps on writing deeper and deeper for the whole twelve 
hours.’ ” (from: In The Penal Colony. Kafka, 2005, p.149) 
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(Richard Zeiss: XXXIII, 2015, egg tempera and yacht varnish on 
tarpaulin, 206 x 110cm; at Hockney Gallery/RCA, London) 
 
By referring to the aforementioned passage of the sublime in heavens 
and the ocean (“as poets do”)28 in Kant, Paul de Man basically 
attempts to illustrate how such nonphenomenal reading could 
manifest itself. It brought me back to the prisoner in Kafka’s Penal 
Colony. The text is not fully conclusive, but it seems the prisoner’s 
death and “enlightenment” as the officer calls it, that is to say, the 
phenomenal turn, occur roughly at the same time. Much like in 
Newman’s reading of Agnes Martin’s work, so here, too, both 
mathematical and dynamic sublime can be brought to bear. The 
process of machine-led, quasi-formalist inscription on the prisoner’s 
body as a protracted process of apprehension and comprehension, 
similar to the way Kant uses these terms in the discussion of the 
mathematical sublime, seems to echo the way those two principles 
                                                
28 Again, for reference:  
“If, then, we call the sight of the starry heaven sublime, we must not place at the 
foundation of judgement concepts of world worlds inhabited by rational beings 
and regard the bright points, with which we see the space above us as filled, as 
their suns moving in circles purposively fixed with reference to them; but we 
must regard it, just as we see it …, as a distant, all-embracing vault. … To find 
the ocean nevertheless sublime we must regard it as poets do …, merely by 
what the eye reveals … – if it is at rest, as a clear mirror of water only bounded 
by the heavens; if it is stormy, as an abyss threatening to overwhelm 
everything.” (Kant quoted in de Man, 1983, p.80) 
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are at work when Newman illustrates them in his essay on Martin. “It 
is possible here”, says Newman “to bring up for comparison the 
experience of Martin’s paintings: as we attempt to increase the 
number of drawn lines that we apprehend, a point of saturation is 
fairly quickly reached at which we cannot perceive both the 
accumulation of lines in their individual distinctness and the painting 
as a whole.” (Newman, 2011, p.210) 
 
Whether materiality is inscribed into letters (de Man), lines 
(Martin/Newman), or arguably in a space between them (Kafka’s 
Penal Colony), their meaning as individual signs and as a compound 
is independent and incompatible. “When you spell a word, you say a 
certain number of meaningless letters, which then come together in 
the word, but in each of the letters the word is not present. The two 
are absolutely independent of each other.” (de Man, 1986, p.89) The 
idea of inscription as used by de Man is difficult to fathom29. In fact, it 
so escapes our phenomenalised senses that de Man, when 
describing the materiality of inscription, becomes unsurprisingly 
vague: “The materiality (as distinct from the phenomenality) that is 
thus revealed, the unseen ‘cristal’ [sic!] whose existence thus 
becomes a certain there and a certain then which can become a here 
and a now in the reading ‘now’ taking place, is not the materiality of 
the mind or of a time… – none of which exist, except in the figure of 
prosopopeia30 – but the materiality of an inscription.” (1986, p.51; 
original emphasis; special characters edited) And he continues, 
tracing out an area rather than a point by explaining what inscription 
is not: “Inscription is neither a figure, nor a sign, nor a cognition, nor a 
hypogram, nor a matrix…” (1986, p.51) It is not explicitly clear, what 
inscription is, then, yet it is material enough, so to speak, to be 
constituent of words, sentences, and thus language. Much like in so-
called virtual salami fraud31, the individual constituent parts (in the 
                                                
29 As pointed out earlier, Derrida suggests an account of writing and as such inscription that has 
no origin and thus has always been there. The parallels to certain religions are as difficult to 
miss as the challenge to grasping this concept in a tangible fashion is unsurprising. Paul de 
Man seems to follow Derrida’s account in this context. 
30 A rhetorical device in which a speaker or writer communicates to the audience by speaking 
as another person or object. 
31 “The classic story about a salami attack is the old “collect-the-roundoff” trick. In this scam, a 
programmer modifies the arithmetic routines such as interest computations. Typically, the 
calculations are carried out to several decimal places beyond the customary 2 or 3 kept for 
financial records. For example, when currency is in dollars, the roundoff goes up to the nearest 
penny about half the time and down the rest of the time. If the programmer arranges to collect 
 34 
context of this paper, inscribed letters; in salami fraud, the third and 
following decimal places of an amount of money) are not defined, or 
most literally do not compute, in the overarching, phenomenalised 
system. Yet by way of accumulation they then pass the invisible 
threshold into that system: fractions of cents, not actually on the 
books in accessible form, add up to millions of, for example, US 
dollars. And Agnes Martin’s work is synthesised despite the 
“unsynthesizability of proximate and distant views” (Newman, 2011, 
p.213). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
these fractions of pennies in a separate account, a sizable fund can grow with no warning to the 
financial institution.” (Kabay, 2002, p.1) 
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FROM TELEOLOGY THROUGH AGNES MARTIN INTO THE 
PRESENT 
 
I have discussed how painting has been under critical scrutiny from 
its early theorisation by Malevich and will further develop how it 
appeared to be a dialectic of expanded materialism and 
transcendental ideas: expanded, because it was footed on the idea of 
an artificial language (Zaum) as material, expanding artistic 
possibilities32; transcendental, because, as Foster, Krauss, Bois, 
Buchloh point out,  
 
“Malevich was not a positivist (he always stuck to an 
antirationalist point of view that brought him, especially in 
his late, postrevolutionary texts, close to a mystical 
position). Even in the most ‘deductive’ of his canvases, he 
always made sure that his squares were slightly skewed 
so that (by virtue of the [making strange] one would notice 
their stark simplicity and read them as stubbornly ‘one’ 
(both unique and whole) rather than identifying them as 
geometric figures. For what mattered most to him, as he 
kept repeating, was ‘intuition’” (Foster, Krauss, Bois, 
Buchloh, 2004, p.132) 
 
Malevich’s practice was also driven by a strongly essentialist 
teleology: “Malevich thought that each art had to define its own 
essence by eliminating those conventions deemed unnecessary and, 
in this evolutionary march, each work was to be a step beyond the 
preceding one…” (Foster, Krauss, Bois, Buchloh, 2004, p.134) The 
empathically teleological nature of Malevich’s project also manifests 
itself in the way he would date his paintings: his was the conviction 
that, while a flashback or review was acceptable, it would have been 
“morally wrong to present something which could (and should) have 
been done in 1912 as dating from 1928” (Foster, Krauss, Bois, 
Buchloh, 2004, p.134)  
 
                                                
32 As Chlenova (2014, p.69) explains, “[t]he boundless space that Malevich extolled from his 
first Suprematist manifestos was… a very concrete result of as sustained scrutiny of the way in 
which language functions as a system of arbitrarily established signs whose immobilising net 
could be lifted by radically new artistic forms.” 
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Malevich’s essentialist teleology would re-emerge in the writings of 
Clement Greenberg, albeit in a more positivist fashion and (therefore) 
bereft of Malevich’s mysticism. In his often-cited essay “Modernist 
Painting” (1960), Greenberg famously claimed that “[t]he essence of 
Modernism lies, as I see it, in the use of characteristic methods of a 
discipline to criticize the discipline itself, not in order to subvert it but 
in order to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence.” 
(Greenberg, 1960, p.85) He isolates flatness as the unique factor of 
paintings (see also p.12, FN9), and focusing on the issue of 
materiality, he continues 
 
“Realistic, naturalistic art had dissembled the medium, 
using art to conceal art; Modernism used art to call 
attention to art. The limitations that constitute the medium 
of painting – the flat surface, the shape of the support, the 
properties of the pigment – were treated by the Old 
Masters as negative factors that could be acknowledged 
only implicitly or indirectly. Under Modernism these same 
limitations came to be regarded as positive factors, and 
were acknowledged openly. Manet’s became the first 
Modernist pictures by virtue of the frankness with which 
they declared the flat surfaces on which they were 
painted.” (Greenberg, 1960, p.86) 
 
Greenberg appraised, and gave critical licence to, painting about 
painting, a form of practice that was centripetal, self-referential, and 
self-critical in nature. This kind of painting would ponder its conditions 
and, (in its purest form) rejecting external references, would put its 
own materiality under scrutiny. As Lucy Lippard put it, “[The paintings 
of] Ralph Humphrey, Robert Ryman, and Brice Marden… emphasise 
the fact of painting as painting, surfaces as surface, paint as paint in 
an inactive, unequivocal manner.” (1969, p.58)  
 
Greenberg arguably wrote the aforementioned essay, “Modernist 
Painting”, on the cusp of what is often referred to high or late 
modernism. It was from around that time onwards, and more so in the 
second half of the 1960s, that painters would start trying to negotiate 
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a way of expanding the narrow limits set by Greenberg’s text. This is 
not to say that they would not continue to explore the modus operandi 
of painting and questions of materiality. Sam Gilliam, whose work 
seems to be going through a renaissance of recognition and 
commercial success as we speak, is a case in point. In the second 
half of the 1960s he started exploring the bandwidth of parameters 
that the support of paintings offered him. His suspended and draped 
paintings, rather than deliberately trying to reject Greenberg’s 
formalist framework, would seek to expand said parameters. 
However, Staff claims that  
 
“[the paintings] repudiated a number of precepts that 
worked to underwrite, if not legitimise the formalist 
reading of painting. Firstly, the paintings played fast and 
loose with modernism’s articulation – both verbal and 
physical – of painting. Whilst they were, indeed, 
foregrounded by their materiality, their physical presence, 
their somewhat theatrical timbre, eschewed the ostensibly 
reductivising impulse of formalist aesthetics. Rather than 
engage in a discourse that was organised around a 
process of purification and repudiation of what was 
deemed to be unnecessary, extraneous detail, a painting 
such as Light Depth (1969) ratcheted up both the 
seemingly flamboyant and the playful within modernist 
abstraction – characteristics that formalist criticism had 
sought to avoid.” (Staff, 2013, p.24; original emphasis) 
 
Although it seemed like Greenberg’s ideas had been sidelined by the 
mid-1970s, they never really went away. They always remained in the 
common consciousness of painting, even if at times they did so more 
as a negative soundboard than as a positive set of rules along which 
to align one’s painterly practice. Their positive or negative relevance 
has been of an almost cyclical nature, and painting about painting 
has been sometimes more, sometimes less loosely manifest in 
contemporary practice until now, as has the prevalence of questions 
of materiality. It would appear that modernist and postmodern 
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painting have been astutely aware of the underlying meta-narrative of 
the material turn, as it has been referred to33. 
 
One way Agnes Martin is relevant in this context is through Paul de 
Man’s reading of the materiality in her work (via Michael Newman). 
De Man’s notion of pure materiality rests on the re-reading of Kant’s 
sublime which in turn, following de Man, would appear “non-
aesthetic” – or so I interpret his statement, “What makes the sublime 
compatible with reason is its independence from sensory experience; 
it is beyond the senses…” (1983, p.125). This takes de Man to the 
linguistic moment in painting and music, which results from the 
function of literature34:  
 
“Literature involves the voiding, rather than the 
affirmation, of aesthetic categories. One of the 
consequences of this is that, whereas we have 
traditionally been accustomed to reading literature by 
analogy with the plastic arts and with music, we now have 
to recognise the necessity of a non-perceptual, linguistic 
moment in painting and music, and learn to read pictures 
rather than to imagine meaning.” (de Man, 1986, p.10, 
original emphasis) 
 
By setting up this linguistic moment in painting (and music; within the 
context of this paper, I am of course focusing on painting) that is 
suspicious of aesthetics, de Man implicitly postulates the relevance of 
                                                
33 Iris van der Tuin from Utrecht University: “[T]he material turn focuses on the agency of artistic 
material itself.” (2014) 
34 The way de Man arrives at this statement is through his semiotic considerations, which hinge 
on the relationship between word and thing: according to de Man, while the phenomenality of 
the signifier (i.e. the sound) does play a part in the correspondence between the name and the 
thing named, the link between word and thing, that is to say the relationship, is not phenomenal. 
De Man calls it “conventional” (1986, p.10), which I read as non-aesthetic. According to de Man, 
this freedom from referential restraint makes the language “epistemologically highly suspect and 
volatile” (1986, p.10), as its use is now arguably no longer determined by considerations of truth 
and falsehood, good and evil, or beauty and ugliness. What we are dealing with here is the 
autonomous potential of language, and where this negative knowledge about the reliability of 
language is made available, is, as de Man points out, literariness, or indeed, literature. (NB this 
lack of reliability of literature somewhat echoes Blanchot’s take on the defiance of literature to 
interpretation.) Consequently, the material, phenomenal aspects of the signifier are being 
foregrounded, which “creates a strong illusion of aesthetic seduction at the very moment when 
the actual aesthetic function has been, at the very least, suspended. It is inevitable that 
semiology … be considered formalistic in the sense of being aesthetically rather than 
semantically valorised, but the inevitability of such an interpretation does not make it less 
aberrant.” (de Man, 1986, p.10) To paraphrase: there is no aesthetic link between word and 
thing, yet the word/signifier is mistakenly seen as aestheticised. As a result, when approached 
from this, in de Man’s eyes, flawed angle, semiology, i.e. the study of the making of meaning, 
hinges on aesthetics, on material accessible to sensual perception, and thus becomes 
phenomenalised. 
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a crucial passage in his essay “Resistance to Theory” by analogy not 
only for literary texts, but also for painting:  
 
“Literary theory can be said to come into being when the 
approach to literary texts is no longer based on non-
linguistic, that is to say, historical and aesthetic 
considerations or, to put it somewhat less crudely, when 
the object of discussion is no longer the meaning or the 
value but the modalities of production and of reception of 
meaning and of value prior to their establishment – the 
implication being that this establishment is problematic 
enough to require an autonomous discipline of critical 
investigation to consider its possibility and its status.” (de 
Man, 1986, p.7, my emphasis) 
 
To paraphrase again, de Man is interested in the question of how 
meaning and value is produced and received in literature – and by 
analogy, in painting – rather than what the meaning and value is. This 
also ties in with earlier accounts of dismemberment geared towards 
the analysis of the part as opposed to the phenomenalised whole in 
Agnes Martin’s paintings. From a broader perspective, this approach 
folds back to an enquiry into “painting as painting” (see above, 
Lippard, p.19) and its economies of production and reception. The 
difference to more traditional accounts of investigation into materiality 
in late modernism is that de Man seems to consider it crucial to pare 
down on (incarnational) aesthetics, on phenomenality. This is where 
the linguistic moment and the aforementioned lack of teleology 
afforded by disarticulation come into play. They could potentially 
facilitate a closer, certainly a different reading of painting, breaking 
down tropes that foster processes of phenomenalisation. 
 
Aspects similar to those in Agnes Martin’s paintings emerge in 
Markus Amm’s work. He is a contemporary painter who upholds the 
tradition of post-Greenberg painterly exploration of material and the 
monochrome35. Amm’s is an experimental, almost illusionist 
                                                
35 The reason I have decided, in terms of current painting, to talk solely about Markus Amm is 
that the way he uses material very clearly echoes aspects of my own studio practice. Markus 
Amm is acutely aware of the external references of his input materials, and often sets them up 
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formalism. However, his illusions stay within the realms of the 
material occurrence. Material parameters like cracks, gaps, surfaces, 
and the hanging of the work are not always what they seem at first to 
the observer. They do not refer to any external referent either; 
whenever the viewer is thrown, the way he catches himself is by 
realising he is still within the limits of materiality rather than outside of 
them. By setting up a loop of material signifiers and referents within 
the work and invariably taking the viewer through this loop, Amm, 
with his interpretation of modernism, navigates a circle of self-
references that is wider than the formalism he borrows from. Amm 
discusses modernism in a contemporary context by resorting to 
highly charged techniques, processes and forms of manifestation 
(NB. the monochrome), all the while allowing him to subject them to 
material with clearly contemporary connotations of urban culture and 
consumerism (e.g. nail varnish, photo collages). 
 
The linguistic moment in Amm’s work would necessarily be 
tantamount to the breakdown of what I referred to as illusionist 
formalism on some level. Much like in Martin’s work, that is not to say 
that illusion, phenomenalisation, will not take over at some point. But 
prior to that take-over, we may find ourselves in a space where we 
get a glimpse of the “modalities of the production of meaning” before 
its establishment. The cracks in some of his works; paper collaged 
onto canvas; tape; photograms and the monochrome as modernist 
tropes: just like Martin’s inscribed materiality (i.e. the graphite lines), 
Amm’s economies of production also hinge on constituent “letters”, in 
a manner of speaking. In difference to Martin’s homogenous lines, 
however, Amm’s letters are more prone to cluster into 
phenomenalised patches. The non-teleological Augenschein has to 
be almost aggressively disruptive, anticoagulant, so as to facilitate a 
reading that is closer to radical materiality. We have to create a blind 
spot to be able to see “like the poets do”, actively refraining from 
seeing teleological, referential purpose in any of the material tropes 
Amm uses. This is not the least due the fact that one of Amm’s 
                                                                                                                                                   
against each other, to throw not only the viewer, but also their own respective connotational 
background through economies of mutual reinforcement, shifts, or subversions of externally 
derived teleologies. This chimes with my own work, for example when I use materials like egg 
tempera and tarpaulin. I therefore find his painting particularly pertinent to my research and 
practice. 
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painterly strategies is in fact, as outlined above, the creation of 
illusion: material, to a certain degree self-referential illusion, but 
illusion all the same. Amm’s range of different material input offers a 
wide potential for tropes, quite in contrast to Martin’s lines. These 
different tropological materials are keyed into different narratives of 
incarnation, so one could argue that they required different forms or 
degrees of dismemberment to act as catalyst for non-relational 
materiality. Non-teleological perception will be harder to produce for 
some of the material manifestations Amm resorts to than for others. 
The fact that achieving non-teleological vision is not exactly 
straightforward suggests a potential for an oscillation in Amm’s work 
between pure materiality and phenomenality; a falling into 
phenomenality, of sorts. In Martin’s work, this oscillation was driven 
by proximity vs. distance, whereas in Amm’s pictures, it is not only 
the distance and the resulting differences in perception that fuel this 
oscillation, but also the degree to which different processes and 
materials in Amm provoke said falling into the phenomenal. 
 
 
 
 
(Markus Amm: Untitled #4, 2008, oil paint, oil-based enamel paint 
and paper on canvas, 130 x 185cm) 
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CONCLUSION 
 
De Man’s look at pure materiality and the translation of his linguistic 
moment into painting seems like an approach that complements, 
enriches the investigation into materiality that we have seen in 
modern painting over the past decade. In accepting 
phenomenalisation at the far end, it never claims to be an exclusive 
alternative to purely phenomenological, aesthetic accounts. Instead, 
what de Man provides us with is a complementary approach, a 
different angle. It comes with the territory of visual arts that the 
attempt to see/perceive/sense pure, radical, non-relational materiality 
as described above will always cause a kind of phenomenal catch 22. 
De Man offers a way of seeing such form of materiality in Kant’s 
sublime; a materiality that is of a non-teleological nature and 
detached from any purpose. This material vision and disarticulation 
are what de Man suggests can allow us to see radical materiality. As 
it turns out, bringing this concept to bear on painting is conceptually 
more easily posited than put into reality for individual paintings. I 
would suggest that the merit of de Man’s contribution lies within a 
higher level of conceptualisation than on that of the individual work of 
art. While the default setting of traditional accounts of materiality for 
example in Greenberg explores the modalities of the production of 
meaning from a thoroughly aestheticised perspective – Greenberg 
seems to shift his focus from material to opticality, and thus from 
production to reception over time – a de Manian reading adds to that 
another layer of exploration. This might help in teasing out the 
modalities at play more clearly and facilitate a fresh approach to how 
materiality in contemporary art is looked at.  
 
Resorting to Zaum language, Kazimir Malevich started something in 
painting that has now re-emerged on the linguistic level and heralded 
a linguistic turn as postulated by Paul de Man. What makes de Man’s 
contribution contemporary is the fact that by introducing a kind of 
materiality that occurs prior to sensual perception, de Man suggests if 
not a way of overcoming, then at least an extension of, the canonised 
accounts of phenomenalised materiality. Polemically speaking, his 
approach puts the post in Greenberg’s post-Kantian critique by re-
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reading Kant non-aesthetically. As pointed out above, the translation 
of de Man’s linguistic concept of pre-phenomenal materiality into the 
field of visual arts comes with one major implied challenge: strictly 
speaking, it calls for non-aesthetic “perception” of a visual medium. 
However, the power of de Man’s approach maybe lies within its 
liminal nature: it takes the engagement with painting to the limits of 
the senses and, since one will also find it impossible to put the 
experience into words, to the limits of language. And one finds 
oneself engaging with painting on a level that is beyond the senses 
and that defies description – literally.  
 
 
 
(Richard Zeiss: XXXV, 2015, egg tempera and yacht varnish on 
tarpaulin, 155 x 155cm; at T-A-P, Southend) 
 
In terms of my own painting practice, one of the crucial questions has 
been what to take from de Man’s reading of materiality – indeed, of 
radical, pure materiality – and how to bring it to bear in my work. 
Specifically, the friction of non-aesthetic materiality vs. 
phenomenalised materiality has been a lynchpin of my thinking. The 
issues associated with de Man, on the tangible level of the studio, are 
obvious and have been discussed above: in simple terms, the 
 44 
question of how pure material vision can relate to specific paintings is 
particularly complex.  
 
 
 
(Richard Zeiss: XXXIX, 2015, egg tempera and yacht varnish on 
tarpaulin, 170 x 120cm, backlit by daylight; at NN Contemporary Art 
Northampton) 
 
My approach involves an alchemical aspect to the extent that I am 
aware of some of the properties of the materials I use, but when 
combined, they amount to something potentially unknown. Materials 
come with connotations, external referents, indeed, teleologies: egg 
tempera, often my medium of choice, arguably refers to pre-
modernist, often religious painting; another material I have used 
frequently, tarpaulin, may come with connotations of industrial sites, 
construction, and is generally held in low esteem, if one were to 
establish a hierarchy of materials. By combining the two, I might 
argue I am causing a clash of connotations, of references, of 
teleologies of the respective materials. Here, rather than having to go 
through the process of dismemberment or disarticulation with regard 
to the materials involved, as was the case with Markus Amm and 
Agnes Martin, I suggest I might be ending up with materials that have 
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already subverted each others’ teleology. Conceptually, one might 
argue I would be looking at non-teleological, pure materiality.  
 
 
 
(Richard Zeiss: No.51, 2016, egg tempera and yacht varnish on 
tarpaulin, brass grommets, tension wires, 163 x 106cm (net); London 
studio) 
 
While it is crucial to my practice for me to know how I can navigate 
the field of potential non-phenomenal materiality “in the flesh”, I find it 
important to bear in mind the underlying notion that de Man’s posit 
might not be an accessible option throughout my work and at all 
times. As we have seen, both Agnes Martin and Markus Amm fall into 
phenomenality, depending on certain variables. What I can hope for 
my practice, and what I think could be productive, is to negotiate the 
economies of non-phenomenal vs. phenomenal oscillation in a 
deliberate fashion; to find where the threshold lies, and what the 
drivers of the turn are; and to see whether they are located more on 
the side of production, or on the side of reception.  
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(Richard Zeiss: No.52 & No. 52 (detail), 2016, egg tempera and yacht 
varnish on tarpaulin, 74 x 188cm; at the RCA, London) 
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EPILOGUE I 
 
I have recently been working with silver gelatine. Due to studio 
logistics I would use that medium not as potential carrier of 
information of light and dark but as medium deprived and exhausted 
of its fundamental capabilities. In other words, I would work with silver 
gelatine that had been exposed to daylight and was therefore, for lack 
of a better word, dead. I was using its corpse, its empty shell. The 
more often I worked with this corpse, the harder I would find it to 
shake off a slight disgust, yet a perverted sense of material 
necrophilia brought me back to the canvas every time. There I was, 
applying a liquid cadaver that was still pristinely white and suggested 
a virgin state, yet with the first ray of light that touched it, it had 
already passed into a state of in-between. The strangeness I feel 
about this work is echoed in Blanchot’s “Two Versions of The 
Imaginary”, when he says that “it could be that the strangeness of a 
cadaver is also the strangeness of the image. What we call the mortal 
remains evades the usual categories: something is there before us 
that is neither the living person himself nor any sort of reality, neither 
the same as the one who was alive, nor another, nor another thing.” 
(Blanchot, 1955, p.81) 
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EPILOGUE II 
 
This. 
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(Richard Zeiss: XXXV (detail), 2015, egg tempera and yacht varnish 
on tarpaulin, 155 x 155cm) 
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